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Behavioral Economics and Insurance:
Principles and Solutions
Howard Kunreuther
Mark Pauly1
February 2014
Introduction
It is easy for a consumer to make mistakes in insurance markets, especially when deciding
whether to purchase insurance against low-probability, high-consequence (LP-HC) events.
They have a hard time collecting and processing information to determine the likelihood
and consequences of these risks which (by definition) they have had limited or no
experience. Hence, people often rely on feelings and intuition rather than careful thought
when it comes time to decide what coverage to purchase
On the supply side, insurance companies face the risk of experiencing large claims
payments, only part of which can be spread or diversified away through the law of large
numbers if losses are highly correlated. Decision makers in the insurance industry and
those who regulate, litigate, and legislate about insurance are also likely to make mistakes
for the same reasons that consumers do — they rely primarily on their intuition rather than
undertaking deliberative thinking because they have limited information from past
experience on which to base their decisions.
In this paper we take a realistic but optimistic view of the prospects for improving the
functioning of insurance markets. Our primary goal is to specify, explain, and justify
principles for structuring and governing insurance markets to account for buyers and
sellers who make mistakes. A secondary goal is to propose market and regulatory
structures in accordance with these principles.
We use two recent examples of legislation – the National Flood Insurance Reform Act and
the Affordable Care Act – to illustrate how insurance could be redesigned to adhere to
these principles much of the time—but not all the time. These public policies are intended
to encourage consumers to purchase insurance that they ought to have, but often do not.
We also consider other possible policies designed to correct systematic examples of
people buying insurance at high premiums when deliberative decision making suggests
that it would be more appropriate to go without coverage. We conclude by building on
these examples to suggest future strategies involving either the public and/or private
sector.
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Behavioral Economics and Insurance: Core Findings and Political Prospects
According to insurance theory, those at risk benefit from incurring a small cost in the form
of a premium to obtain protection against an event that could produce significant financial
losses but that has a low probability of occurrence. If insurance can be offered with
relatively small administrative costs so it is reasonably priced, a risk averse individual
should prefer a smaller certain premium to taking the chance of experiencing a large loss
(Arrow 1971). If properly designed and priced, insurance also offers incentives in the form
of premium reductions for people who mitigate their risk in a cost effective way, if the
insurer can accurately incorporate the impact these mitigation measures will have on
reducing the likelihood and/or consequences of events for which they offer financial
protection (Shavell 1979).
There is considerable empirical evidence that many consumers fail to take advantage of
insurance protection against losses of property and health, and do not invest in efficient
loss reduction measures in the LP-HC setting. In both cases they fail to behave in ways
that would not only benefit them personally ex ante, but might also enhance social welfare
if there are societal concerns about people’s ex post wellbeing. Behavioral economics
offers some explanations for these decisions and suggests remedies. However, designing
these solutions may require interventions by public and private institutions beyond just
structuring information and options to take advantage of individuals’ decision processes.
To illustrate this point, field and controlled experiments in behavioral economics reveal
that consumers are sometimes more likely to select a default option rather than going to
the trouble of opting out in favor of some other alternative. These findings have been used
to encourage consumers to choose options that are in their best interests, such as better
(dominant) 401(k) plans (Madrian and Shea 2001) and to adopt the “Save More
Tomorrow” plans that encourage consumers to earmark a portion of their increased
earnings into these plans (Thaler and Benartzi 2004). Default options have also been used
to increase the number of organ donations (Johnson and Goldstein 2003) and in other
programs detailed in the important book, Nudge (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). To date, this
framing technique has been applied to situations where the outcome is either known with
certainty, or when the chosen option (such as a recommended 401(k) plan), has a higher
expected return than the other options.
For decisions under uncertainty that involve insurance, the economic benefits of having
coverage are reaped only when the (low-probability) loss-producing event occurs. It is
unlikely that most people who failed to purchase insurance would reverse course if a loss
did not occur, or purchase coverage even if insurance were the default option.
In this regard, there is considerable empirical evidence that insurance behavior is guided
by misperception of the risk, and the use of simple but inappropriate heuristic decision
rules. Many who do not purchase property and health insurance perceive the likelihood of
a serious event to be below their threshold level of concern. Individuals are often
unwilling to voluntarily buy insurance coverage against a particular risk until after
experiencing a loss. Many who purchased a policy are likely to cancel it if they have not
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made a claim after several years because they consider their insurance purchase to be a
poor investment decision (Kunreuther, Pauly and McMorrow 2013).
It may thus be necessary to utilize more stringent policy tools, such as premium subsidies
or mandatory coverage, to induce individuals to protect themselves when they should have
protection. Mandating insurance against losses from natural disasters or serious illnesses
can also be justified from the vantage point of social welfare if the majority of citizens feel
that those at risk should protect themselves financially before losses occur rather than
relying afterwards on federal disaster relief covered by taxpayers’ money. Justifying such
requirements politically has proven to be difficult given individuals’ lack of interest in
voluntarily purchasing coverage against LP-HC events.
As noted above, two significant pieces of legislation in the last two years have recognized
the biases and heuristics utilized by individuals at risk and have taken steps to address
them. The Biggert-Waters Act in July 2012 (112th Congress) proposed major reforms to
the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP); the Affordable Care Act (ACA) passed in
2010 (111th Congress), is implementing reforms in health insurance to expand coverage.
Both these Acts require consumers to buy coverage at reasonable or even favorable
premiums while recognizing the need to make the purchase of insurance more feasible for
low- and medium-income individuals; Biggert-Waters authorizes FEMA to fund a study
on affordability of flood insurance by examining the role that means tested means-tested
vouchers (in the same spirit as food stamps) and other financial arrangements could play
in this regard.2 The ACA offers insurance to individuals and small groups through
exchanges to be subsidized with means-tested tax credits. Both Acts encourage the
adoption of risk reducing measures.
Other countries have also incentivized individuals to undertake protective measures and
mandated the purchase of insurance against natural disasters and health risks. In the case
of natural hazards, in France, New Zealand and Spain, the government plays a key role by
providing insurance coverage against all disasters and requiring those at risk to protect
themselves with insurance (OECD 2008). With respect to health insurance, all developed
countries have compelled virtually universal coverage of catastrophic medically-related
expenses, with financing through tax or tax-like instruments.
Even so, challenges to such universal requirements persist in all countries. Mandates
usually permit exceptions (for higher income people, for non-citizens, for certain classes
of risk or types of medical care). Public support for mandates in the U.S. is still rather
weak, and other countries are having second thoughts about some aspects of their
programs. So it is clear that in a democracy, any normative theory will have to be linked
to politics.
Intuitive Thinking by Consumers, Insurers and Regulators
For LP-HC events such as natural disasters, terrorism or catastrophic health-related
expenses, not only consumers but also insurers and regulators often do not behave in
2This
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accordance with the normative theory of insurance theory but follow their intuitions. After
a severe loss, insurers may refuse to continue to offer coverage against this risk because
they focus on the losses from a worst-case scenario without adequately reflecting on the
likelihood of this event occurring in the future. State insurance commissioners sometimes
restrict insurers from setting premiums that reflect risk to address equity and fairness
issues, sacrificing efficiency in the process.
If decision makers were to engage be more deliberative in their thinking when making
choices under uncertainty, they would likely compare alternatives by estimating the
likelihoods of different events occurring and their consequences, and make tradeoffs
between the expected costs and benefits of each option.
The characterization of judgment and choice that distinguishes intuitive thinking from
deliberative thinking builds on a large body of cognitive psychology and behavioral
decision research. A recent summary has been provided by Daniel Kahneman in his
stimulating book Thinking, Fast and Slow (Kahneman 2011) as detailed in Box 1:
Box 1: Intuitive and Deliberative Decision Making
Intuitive Thinking, System 1
Operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no voluntary control.
Uses simple and concrete associations, including emotional reactions or simple rules of
conduct that have been acquired by personal experience with events and their
consequences.
Deliberative Thinking, System 2
Initiates and executes effortful and intentional abstract cognitive operations when needed.
Cognitive operations include complex computations and formal logic.

Intuitive thinking often draws upon the experiences, expectations, goals and beliefs of the
parties involved in the decision. Such sources and heuristics typically require far less
effort than more detailed analysis of the trade-offs among the options. Even when
decision makers make an effort to think carefully, the intuitive appeal of some heuristics
implies that they still make mistakes. While intuitive processes often lead to reasonably
good decisions, they do not work well for LP-HC events, either because of a decision
maker’s undue focus on a recent event or because individuals perceive the likelihood of an
extreme event to be below their threshold level of concern.
Deliberative thinking with respect to assessing risks requires considerable time and
attention and the use of decision tools such as probability estimation, Bayesian updating,
and the use of formal logic. Consumers at risk would ideally make their decision on
whether to purchase insurance – and if so, how much coverage – by comparing the
4

expected costs and benefits of a set of different alternatives available to them using
models of choice such as expected utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944) or
decision analysis (Raiffa 1968). If insurance premiums reflected risk and households used
these more formal models, those facing an LP-HC event would purchase coverage. If all
consumers at risk (rather than just a fraction of them) undertook deliberative (System 2)
thinking, then flood insurance and catastrophic health insurance coverage would be
viewed as highly valuable and would be purchased by almost everyone.
Consumer behavior
While intuitive perceptions of risk are relatively accurate over a broad range of situations
where one has considerable experience, individuals are likely to deviate from expert
assessments of unfamiliar risks that involve small probabilities and high degrees of
uncertainty (Cutler and Zeckhauser 2004; Kunreuther, Pauly and McMorrow 2013).
These events are subject to the availability bias where the judged likelihood of an event
depends on its salience (Tversky and Kahneman 1973). There is thus a tendency to ignore
rare risks until after a disaster occurs.
This is a principal reason why individuals tend to purchase insurance only after a disaster
and cancel their policies several years later when they have not suffered a loss and
perceive the likelihood of a disaster as so low that they do not pay attention to its potential
consequences. An in-depth analysis of the entire portfolio of the NFIP revealed that the
median tenure of flood insurance was between two and four years while the average
length of time in a residence was seven years (Michel-Kerjan, Lemoyne de Forges, and
Kunreuther 2012). This behavior occurs even when homeowners are required to purchase
flood insurance as a condition for a federally insured mortgage.
The relatively thin market for catastrophic coverage is due to the unwillingness of a
majority of buyers to pay a relatively small additional premium for essentially unlimited
coverage. This may be the reason that 55 to 60 percent of private group insurance (which
covers more than 90 percent of those with private insurance) contained some kind of
lifetime cap on benefits before health reform (Musco and Somers 2012). The choices to
limit coverage of catastrophic health-related events for employment-based groups were
generally made by employers or unions, not individual workers. These agents for the
employees should have strong incentives to avoid mistakes but they still make them. This
same mistake in insurance design has been made by the government for public Medicare
Part A plan where there are lifetime limits for coverage of inpatient care.
Such coverage limits seem irrational given the low costs and high benefits of protection.
In a large insurance plan, very few beneficiaries would reach this upper limit, usually in
the millions of dollars. Those groups who self-insure could buy reinsurance at relatively
low prices to cover the costs of these events. The incremental premium to remove such
limits is very low – less than one percent of what the insurer is currently charging
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2009). For example, if health insurance costs $2,000 a year,
then removing the upper limit would add less than $20 to the premium. And yet many
consumers ended up with coverage that did not include this low cost of added protection.
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The recent reform legislation requires all new private health insurance contracts to
eliminate such limits (Musco and Somers 2012).
Insurer behavior
It is easy to understand how consumers make mistakes about insurance. Surprisingly,
insurance managers, despite high levels of expertise and strong incentives to make logical
decisions, also make errors with respect to situations where there is uncertainty or
ambiguous information regarding the low probability risks they face. When insurers have
limited data and limited past experience with extreme events, there is a tendency for them
to engage in intuitive thinking when determining what coverage to offer against specific
risks and how much to charge.
To illustrate, prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, actuaries and
underwriters, despite their mathematical expertise and experience, did not specify a price
for protection against terrorism coverage nor did they exclude this coverage from their
standard commercial policies. This implied that they were essentially covering this risk for
the very modest add-on for unspecified events included in typical property insurance
premiums. The failure to examine the financial risks associated with terrorism was
surprising given the attempted bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, the 1995
Oklahoma City bombing and other terrorist attacks throughout the world. This behavior by
insurers is in the spirit of a safety first model originally proposed by Roy (1952). It
implies actuaries and underwriters do not focus on risks for which they perceive the
probability of an event to be below their threshold level of concern (Kunreuther, Pauly
and McMorrow 2013).
Following 9/11, most insurance companies completely changed course and refused to
offer coverage against terrorism, considering it to be an uninsurable risk despite increased
buyer demand. The few who did provide insurance charged extremely high premiums for
coverage (Wharton Risk Center 2005). Prior to these terrorist attacks Chicago’s O’Hare
Airport had $750 million of terrorism insurance coverage at an annual premium of
$125,000. After 9/11, insurers offered the airport only $150 million of coverage at an
annual premium of $6.9 million. This reflected an increase in the cost per dollar coverage
of over 275 percent! The airport was forced to purchase this policy since it could not
operate without coverage (Jaffee and Russell 2003). The Golden Gate Park in San
Francisco was simply unable to obtain terrorism coverage at any price (Smetters 2004).
If actuaries and underwriters had used estimates based on more formal models of choice
that characterize deliberative (System 2) thinking for determining protection against these
extreme events, they would have more accurately estimated the change in likelihood of
future terrorist attacks in different parts of the country and their potential consequences.
Insurers could then have determined what types and amounts of coverage they would want
to offer and the prices they would have to charge so as to maximize their expected future
profits based on their current portfolio of policies. It seems implausible to us that they
would have concluded that the likelihood of terrorist attacks took such a large jump as to
call for the kinds of premiums just described.
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In contrast, private insurers have been willing to offer catastrophic coverage for health
insurance; its absence usually reflects inadequate demand by consumers as discussed
above. Because illnesses that are financially catastrophic for patients are uncorrelated,
even health insurers of moderate size are not concerned about a large loss relative to their
portfolio from a single person’s high medical expense.
Regulator behavior
Insurance regulators have aided Florida homeowners in hurricane-prone areas by keeping
property insurance costs lower than they would be if private insurers were free to charge
premiums that reflected risk. Following Hurricane Andrew in 1992, insurers were only
allowed to raise rates gradually over the next decade and were restricted from canceling
existing homeowners’ policies. Moreover, political pressure from residents in hurricaneprone areas to reduce homeowners’ premiums led the state legislature in 2007 to form a
residual market mechanism, Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, which offers
premiums at highly subsidized rates, thus undercutting the private market. Today, Citizens
is the largest provider of wind coverage in Florida. There have been no severe hurricanes
in the state since 2005, but if Citizens suffers a severe loss from a large hurricane in the
coming years, it is likely to become insolvent. In this case, Florida will have to levy a tax
on its residents and request disaster assistance from the Federal government.
This example illustrates behavior triggered by short-term intuitive thinking by regulators
and legislators. The strategy yields positive returns if there is no hurricane damage in
Florida in the near future, but the current premium structure will lead aggregate claims
payments that exceed premiums in the long run. If regulators had undertaken a more
systematic analysis of the long-term impacts of their behavior, they would not have
formed Citizens in this manner by allowing it to charge highly subsidized premiums. They
should have permitted insurers to charge premiums reflecting risk and found other ways to
aid those residing in hurricane-prone areas needing special treatment. Just as low-income
families are provided with food stamps to buy groceries, low-income residents could be
given means-tested insurance vouchers so they can afford the higher risk-based premiums.
Challenges for Making Positive Changes
A key challenge in utilizing economic incentives for improving insurance choices is that
they may be viewed by some citizens as being unfair or inequitable. Suppose, for example,
the house that a homeowner purchased years ago is now categorized as being in a
floodplain, or a family’s vacation cottage on the coast faces a greater risk of hurricane
damage due to climate change. At the time the property was bought, damage from
hurricanes and floods were not considered a problem. Or suppose some people’s current
health status is adversely affected by past behavior or genetic disease propensities.
Premiums that reflect their current property or health-related risk are likely to be viewed
as unfair by the affected individuals who feel they are too high. But for insurance to
operate efficiently, it is necessary for insurers to raise premiums for those now facing a
higher likelihood of a property loss or illness. Insurers would then be in a position to
charge lower premiums to those that have low expected claims, so that purchasing
coverage is viewed as an attractive option for this group.
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If premiums do not reflect the hazardous location of property or adverse genetic
conditions, insurance will be ipso facto subsidized for these high-risk individuals. They
will have less reason to undertake actions to reduce their risk because they will not be
rewarded with lower premiums. Another result will be that lower-risk consumers who
undertake deliberative thinking will tend to purchase less insurance. In fact, they will
likely run away from coverage if premiums are set higher than they should be, perceiving
insurance to be a bad buy. On the other hand, the high risks will insure even small losses
because they consider coverage to be a bargain.
In summary, insurance is a policy tool that has two principal purposes – encouraging costeffective investment in loss reduction measures via premium reductions, and providing
financial protection should those at risk suffer severe losses. A system of insurance where
premiums are not risk-based fails to address these two objectives effectively. Insurers will
have limited or no financial incentive to offer reductions in premiums to individuals if
they undertake loss reduction measures. In fact, insurers are losing money on these
individuals in the long run and would prefer that they bought coverage elsewhere.
Individuals who are charged too high a premium are unlikely to purchase coverage.
With respect to state regulation, insurance commissioners may feel compelled to restrict
prices on those facing high risks because they rely on vocal consumers’ support; their
desire for re-election may override their concern for the common good (Pauly, Kunreuther
and Vaupel 1984).
To address these challenges we propose the following guiding principles for making
insurance more transparent, understandable and equitable with the dual objectives of
improving individual and social welfare:
Principle 1: Require insurance against rare catastrophic risks. Given the
reluctance of individuals to voluntary purchase insurance against losses that are large
relative to their wealth or income, catastrophic coverage should be required for all
individuals who face this risk.
Principle 2: Premiums must reflect risk. Insurance premiums should accurately
reflect risk to signal to individuals how safe and healthy they are and to encourage
individuals to undertake measures to reduce their vulnerability to illness and/or property
losses by reducing their premiums. Risk-based premiums should also reflect the cost of
capital that insurers must integrate into their pricing to assure adequate return to their
investors.
Principle 3: Dealing with equity and affordability issues. Any special treatment
given to consumers at risk (e.g., low-income uninsured, high-risk moderate income
groups, or inadequately insured individuals) should come from means-tested insurance
vouchers financed by the federal government or at a state level through general taxes and
not through subsidies generated by higher insurance premiums on lower-risk buyers.
.
Principle 4: Multi-year insurance. A multi-year policy provides stability of
premiums since it prevents individuals from being reclassified into higher risk strata
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during the term of the contract. Such policies currently exist for life insurance and longterm care coverage.
In the case of property insurance where only annual policies are currently
marketed, a multi-year policy could be coupled with long-term loans for cost-effective
hazard reduction measures. The homeowner will be rewarded for undertaking these
investments, inasmuch as the yearly cost of the loan is likely to be less than the annual
premium reduction. State insurance regulators would have to allow insurers to charge
premiums that reflect the reduced risk for those who take the loans and higher premiums
for those who do not.
Even before the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was passed, health insurance policies
achieved multi-year premium stability by including guaranteed renewability at class
average premiums as a policy feature. Under this arrangement, insurers promise not to
single out those whose risk rises for selective premium increases. This gives the insurer
an incentive to keep the insureds healthy, since the insurer is at risk for higher expenses
that might be preventable. Guaranteed renewability also protects consumers from
premium increases due to a deterioration in their health.
The above guiding principles are embraced by the reforms to the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP) in the Biggert-Waters Act. Given that the federal government is the
principal provider of flood coverage to homeowners, it should be feasible to require multiyear policies tied to the property, thus satisfying Principles 1 and 4. Given that many
people cancel their policies if they haven’t suffered a loss, this requirement needs to be
well-enforced in the future. Over the next five years, NFIP premiums on second homes
and those subject to repetitive flooding must reflect risk (Principle 2). This will require the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to improve the accuracy of their flood
maps as recommended by the Government Accountability Office (2004). FEMA’s Map
Modernization Program will result in digital format for 92 percent of the continental U.S.
population. Land development and natural changes to the landscape and/or to hydrologic
systems require continuous map maintenance and updates. The National Research
Council (2009) and the National Academy of Sciences is now undertaking a study of
means-tested insurance vouchers to deal with equity and affordability issues (Principle 3).
The ACA for health insurance, passed only after a major legislative and legal battle,
embodies Principles 1 and 3. Insurance offered to individuals and small groups through
exchanges is to be subsidized with means-tested tax credits (Principle 3). The ACA
mandates penalties on those who do not purchase insurance to encourage the purchase of
catastrophic protection (Principle 1). However, the penalties are weak and may not be
enough to induce low-risk people to purchase coverage. The generous subsidies in the
ACA should be enough to motivate the purchase of coverage by lower income people who
undertake deliberative thinking, but the “outreach” (marketing) activities of the Health
Insurance Marketplaces run by states or the federal government may also need to use
insights from behavioral economics to address the problem of take-up of coverage; they
need to frame the information they provide in a way that convinces people of the true loss
probability and deters them from using the heuristics and biases discussed above.
Specifically, it would be important to have a better understanding of why low-risk people
9

who could have afforded insurance did not purchase it because of imperfect information
and imperfect understanding of insurance, and how they might be expected to change
behavior as regulation increases their premiums but also imposes a mandate and markets
coverage more aggressively.
The ACA does not adhere to Principle 2, as it permits only very limited risk rating of
premiums (restricted primarily to smoking behavior). Healthy younger people who are not
of low income will correctly regard the premiums they will be required to pay in the new
regulated exchanges as high relative to the benefits they can expect to collect, and no
amount of truthful outreach may convince them to buy. There is also some modest public
subsidy of reinsurance to offset the cost to those with high lifetime risks. Principle 4
(multi-year pricing) is, as noted, already required for individual health insurance but the
additional limits on risk based pricing in the new legislation noted above may attenuate
the value of the feature, since protection against premium increases has no value if people
can pay low premiums even if they become higher risks.
Both laws exemplify much of what is needed to improve individual and insurer behavior.
They are designed to move people’s behavior from intuitive processes to more
deliberative thinking with respect to LP-HC events. The contentious and continuing
debate over both pieces of legislation, shows that the policy process does not
automatically or easily generate such corrections; there needs to be persistent and
dedicated political leadership based on skilled use of correct principles.
To be sure, both legislative proposals were directed at more than mistakes by insurers,
consumers, and state regulatory officials that arise from behavioral biases and simplified
heuristics. They are also designed to reduce losses and alleviate the fiscal burden on
governments. But correcting some of those mistakes affected the nature of the legislation.
However, as noted, some of the attempts to improve equity distort insurance premiums
and so frustrate other features in the legislation that were designed to improve the decision
making process. We feel that the guiding principles outlined above are lynchpins not only
for improving the choice process between the insurers and the insured but also will
encourage other stakeholders, such as lenders providing long-term property loans for
encouraging those at risk to invest in preventive or protective measures, or health delivery
systems encouraging cost effective prevention.
Toward a Taxonomy of Government Interventions to Deal with Insurance Anomalies
Property and health insurance are instructive cases for examining the rationale and design
of effective government interventions, whether through insurance regulation, laws that
provide mandates and/or subsidies, or nudges through reframing options that lead people
to make better choices. The flood and health insurance legislation are at the aggressive
end of the spectrum as they involve heavy regulation of offerings and required coverage.
Is this kind of heavy weaponry appropriate for other insurance anomalies that arise from
intuitive thinking?
We hypothesize that there are three features that suggest public intervention:
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Feature 1: Anomalous behavior that involves under-purchase rather than overpurchase of insurance or protection
Feature 2: Anomalous behavior that causes large harm to a populations’ wellbeing
that is of concern to others
Feature 3: Settings where individuals have difficulty taking steps to reduce their
risk
Health insurance for lower income people fits all three of these characteristics. Many lowincome people do not have insurance and the absence of coverage can cause serious harm
to health because it inhibits the use of effective care. These families’ health levels and
(perhaps) their financial status are of concern to their fellow citizens. Individuals are
sometimes reluctant to undertake preventive health measures, such as their failure to take
statin drugs after a heart attack, even when insurance fully covers the cost (Choudhry et al.
2011) or not having their children vaccinated against contagious disease.
Lower income homeowners present a similar case. Many of these families are uninsured
because they cannot afford coverage. Few individuals in high-risk areas voluntarily invest
in measures to reduce their losses from future disasters (Kunreuther, Meyer and MichelKerjan 2013). If they suffer serious damage from a severe disaster, the public is concerned
with their plights and there is sympathy (if not funding) so these disaster victims can
remain in their current location rather than moving to a safer spot.
When one or more of these three features are absent, the case for public intervention is
weaker. We are usually most concerned about people whose use or consumption of some
key good falls below some ideal level, not if it rises above the desirable amount
(Feature 1). Purchasing overpriced warranties illustrates the case where there is an
absence of all of the above features, since the impact on the person buying the warranty
and others is likely to be minimal. In cases such as these, intervention usually involves
warning consumers, providing them with better information and offering them a chance to
get their money back after second thoughts. We conclude that in situations where the
consequence of excessive insurance is just wasted money rather than physical impairment
or significant reduction in assets or wealth, it is not worth the effort for governments to try
(often unsuccessfully) to correct such modest mistakes. Indeed, the loss from mistakenly
buying insurance that is overpriced or unneeded is simply the cost of the insurance. In
contrast, the loss in welfare from not buying needed insurance could be very high indeed.
Risks (of any type) that primarily affect people in higher income brackets or risks that can
be avoided that affect people across the income spectrum are also less likely to be
candidates for intervention even if the consequences of under-purchasing insurance are
large. In these cases, concern by others (Feature 2) is lacking. For example, if Warren
Buffet, famously frugal, had decided not to buy health insurance before he was 65, there is
unlikely to be a strong public policy interest in getting him to do so. There are no health
insurance subsidies for the not-very-poor, though there is a mild penalty associated with
not purchasing coverage for the purpose of maintaining the risk pool so as to subsidize
high risks as a matter of social concern (Feature 2).
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Another example commonly cited as an insurance anomaly is the under-purchase of
annuities. People with accumulated assets should be interested in converting their wealth
to annuities so they can maintain their standard of living for as long as they live. There
were proposals in the early days of the Obama administration from a Treasury official to
reframe choices people make when they retire so taking an indemnity was the default
option for 401(k) accounts. And there is a great deal of academic literature in the subject
that also points to framing as the cause of the problem—without explaining why the
correct framing does not prevail in a competitive market (Kunreuther, Pauly and
McMorrow 2013).
The primary reasons for the lack of interest or enthusiasm for encouraging the purchase of
annuities is that this is a problem facing the upper middle class elderly, who are not a
population of major social concern. Almost everyone has a compulsory annuity in the
form of Social Security, and its benefits are usually enough to keep people in all income
classes above the poverty line (even if just barely). Utilizing some of the limited stock of
political capital to mobilize government to solve a problem that affects primarily people
with six-figure incomes does not have any traction.
The other example of under-protection is in the area of life insurance. Although most
people do have some life insurance protection, they may buy too little and often make the
mistake of dropping their coverage soon after purchasing it because they feel the
premiums are too high given budget constraints (Gottlieb and Smetters 2013). Here again,
life insurance is largely a concern of the middle class and above, and largely protects the
bequests they leave to their middle class heirs so there is little concern by others (that is,
Feature 2 is lacking) and hence no public intervention. The availability of Social Security
death and survivors’ benefits further attenuates the public policy motivation to deal with
this problem beyond applying Band-Aids in the form of disclosure information.
Over-purchasing insurance is another story. Sometimes people do so for good reason. For
example, the partial payment of group medical and dental insurance by employers due to
the tax advantages on group health insurance suggests that one should have more
insurance than one would otherwise purchase.
On the other hand, many people purchase more coverage than would be implied by
System 2 thinking. The most prevalent case is deductible aversion: the desire for low
deductibles. By undertaking deliberative thinking, one would realize that he or she could
save so much more on the premium reduction from purchasing a high deductible on
automobile, homeowners’, or individual health insurance when compared to the expected
benefits in the form of additional claims payments should one suffer a loss.
There are many hypotheses about why people make this mistake: they overestimate the
chances of collecting on the lower deductible, they want to increase the chances of
collecting on their policy so they can view insurance as a positive investment, or they just
want peace of mind and freedom from regret. There are some serious puzzles in the
literature regarding this anomaly. Many individuals do not make a claim on their policy
when their losses exceed the deductible, which suggests they should have taken a higher
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one (Braun et al. 2006). If insurance markets are competitive, how can overpriced low
deductible plans survive? Here again, there are few rules and few advocates for public
policy to deal with this problem because purchasing a low deductible does not satisfy any
of the three features listed above.
Then there are some cases where insurance or insurance-like arrangements can be bundled
with other products. Individuals often go for the bundle even when portions of the package
are overpriced. Insurance for rental cars, appliance warranties, or the purchase of flight
insurance all exhibit this characteristic. We could not find a single public policy initiative
intended to discourage this behavior when these examples show that individuals clearly
misunderstand the purposes of insurance (Liebman and Zeckhauser 2008). These little
mistakes in consumer purchasing just do not seem to rise to the level of social concern
because they normally do not relate to behaviors that are of a concern to others
(Feature 2). They are also do not satisfy the characteristics of Features 1 and 3.
More specifically, there are almost no regulations beyond standard consumer protection
rules that are intended to affect the usual cases of anomalous over-purchase. However,
there are some exceptions. For example, the state of California does require disclosure
that the driver’s own automobile insurance normally applies to a rental car so that
purchase of additional insurance to cover the collision damage waiver may not be needed.
(www.ehow.com/facts_5753168_california-regulations-rental-car-insurance.html).
There is usually no requirement that sellers of automobiles or appliances that provide
warranties hold reserves to assure payment of liabilities under those warranties should a
manufacturer go bankrupt, although there are reserves and other insurance-type
regulations for firms that sell “freestanding” warranties. (The United Kingdom does
requiring a “cooling off” period after a warranty is purchased during which the purchase
can be canceled (Warranty Week 2004). And there are no rules to forbid the purchase or
warn consumers of the rationale for not purchasing low deductible insurance if it carries a
very high incremental premium relative to the actuarial value of the additional coverage.
There have been some attempts by the U.S. Treasury to encourage the purchase of private
annuities by workers with 401(k) accounts (Lieber 2010). Explicitly requiring that an
annuity be the default option, as proposed in 2008 by one Treasury official, did not
become law, but in February 2012 the rules for 401(k)s were changed to make it easier for
employers to offer their own annuity option to employees who might wish to convert their
401(k), and to exempt payments for the “longevity insurance” form of an annuity (one in
which annuity payments do not start until older ages) from the minimum distribution rules
for IRA balances (Ellis 2012). For life insurance, there are no regulations regarding how
premiums can be set for multi-year term insurance. Hence, there is no protection against a
buyer paying a high frontloaded premium and then dropping coverage because of budget
constraints.
Conclusion: in a world where the intrinsic imperfection of government intervention is
both more in evidence and more frequently acknowledged than in the past, there is little
call for policies designed to deal with insurance against events that mostly affect moderate
risks for people in the higher income brackets.
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Insurance When Bad Things Can Happen, But Not Often
As already noted, insurers have had a difficult time maintaining a steady and reliable
supply of reasonably priced coverage against losses that are rare but correlated, with
terrorism and natural disasters as two examples. Even if insurers examine past data in a
systematic manner, there can still be a problem caused by imprecision in estimating future
periods’ loss probabilities when events are rare and the world is changing over time.
Consider the easy case where science and past information were sufficient to convince
buyers of insurance, managers of insurance firms and insurance regulators of the true
probability of the loss-producing event. To illustrate, suppose that one estimates that the
likelihood of a flood next year is in 1 in 100 and that this probability will remain constant
for the foreseeable future. Then there will be no disagreement by the relevant parties as to
what estimate to use for estimating the likelihood of a future flood occurring. There are
some cases that satisfy this condition where our mathematical models are so well validated
and so unambiguous and convincing that experts are in agreement, like the return of
Haley’s Comet.
But what if it has been 50 years since the last Big Flood, and we know that the world is
changing. For example, there are data on global warming and its potential impact on sea
level rise but with considerable uncertainty surrounding these estimates. In cases such as
this one we cannot rely on either recent data and/or theoretical models to provide an
assured, defensible, and unambiguous estimate of the loss probability.
If insurers charge premiums for windstorm or flood insurance based on a low but positive
probability of a damaging event, it is likely that there will be no disaster for years, in
which case the insurer will accumulate enormous underwriting profits. These reserves will
be needed to pay claims when a serious disaster does occur. But the general public and
regulators may become uncomfortable upon learning that the insurer’s surplus has
increased significantly from a series of disaster-free years, claiming that the premiums
being charged are too high.
As discussed earlier, Florida addressed this issue by forming a state-backed insurer
(Citizens Corporation) that charged subsidized premiums. Critics have rightly noted that
this arrangement potentially puts all Florida taxpayers at risk should there be a severe
hurricane and Citizens does not have enough surplus to pay all the claims. In other words,
an intense minority of (often high wealth) property owners residing in hurricane-prone
areas are being highly subsidized by all the residents in Florida.
There is another alternative: mutual insurance. Under this arrangement, if one subsidizes
the premiums, everyone who purchases the insurance will be assessed if reserves and
premiums are inadequate when a disaster occurs. Collecting this assessment ex post may
be difficult, so an alternative (in effect) is to charge higher than actuarially fair premiums
but tell purchasers that a portion of their payment is being held in a fund that they
personally own. Dividends can be declared if the event does turn out to be rarer than
originally anticipated. In this arrangement, policyholders bear the full cost of their
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coverage if an event occurs, but get money back if it does not. In effect, they are protected
with insurance sold at a moderate net price whether the probability turns out to be high or
low.
Supplementing the Guiding Principles in Addressing These Challenges
The four guiding principles can be supplemented by utilizing approaches that alleviate
some of the biases that constitute intuitive (System 1) thinking.
In the case of buyers, we recommend that when presenting information on the likelihood
of an LP-HC event occurring, one stretches the time horizon. Rather than saying that there
is a 1 in 100 chance next year of damage from a severe hurricane, reframe the same
probability by saying that the chance that one’s property will be damaged from a hurricane
in the next 25 years is greater than 1 in 5. Empirical studies have shown that data
presented in this fashion leads individuals to take protective measures (Slovic, Fischhoff
and Lichtenstein 1978; Weinstein, Kolb, and Goldstein 1996).
One of the biggest challenges is to convince consumers that if they don’t suffer losses
from a disaster or incur health related expenditures next year, the purchase of insurance
was not a waste of money. It is extremely difficult to get the message across that those at
risk should celebrate not having collected on their insurance policy. One way to do this is
to remind people that something serious could happen to them next year, so they should
not cancel their insurance policy without good reason.
Before insurers decide to pull out of the market or raise rates significantly after a serious
loss, they should characterize worst-case scenarios and then assign a best guess probability
to each of these events occurring and the uncertainty surrounding these estimates.
Regulators should be appointed for limited terms, rather than being elected, so that they
are less prone to be influenced by special interest groups, and have incentives to develop
programs that improve overall social welfare. Regulatory decisions should make clear
who gains and who loses from these actions and why some deserve to benefit from a given
insurance program and others should have to pay part of the cost of protecting others.
Finally, providing transparent information related to the rationale for insurance should go
a long way to helping the general public better understand this policy tool. Insurance can
then fulfill the roles it is designed to play: reducing future losses and financially protecting
those at risk.
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